IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND, INC.; RYAN BLASER, on his own behalf and as natural guardian for and on behalf of his minor children, K.B.B. and K.S.B.; MICHELLE SANDOZ, on her own behalf and as natural guardian for and on behalf of her minor children, R.S. and E.S.; BARBARA MERCER, an individual; EMILY KNOWLES, on her own behalf and as natural guardian for and on behalf of her minor children, A.G.K. and A.T.K.; and KENDALL NELSON, an individual,

Case No. 1:21-CV-389-DCN

Boise, Idaho February 16, 2022 3:01 p.m.

Plaintiffs.

VS.

CITY OF HAILEY, IDAHO, a municipal corporation; and MARTHA BURKE, in her official capacity as the Mayor of the City of Hailey, as well as in her personal capacity for Purposes of Section 1983 claims asserted herein,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID C. NYE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Proceedings recorded by stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

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(Proceedings commenced at 3:01 p.m., February 16, 2022.) 1 2 THE COURT: Counsel, are we ready to go forward? Yes, Your Honor. 3 MS. FERGUSON: MR. SHOFF: Yes. Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. Patti, if you'll call the 5 6 case, we'll get started. 7 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: The Court will now hear the 8 motion hearing in Health Freedom Defense Fund versus Blaser 9 and the City of Hailey, Case Number 1:21-CV-389. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 Good afternoon, everyone. My understanding is there 12 are three motions for today: a motion to dismiss, a motion 13 for preliminary injunction, and a motion to strike. I'd like 14 to start with the motion to dismiss and argue that one first. 15 Ms. Ferguson, I understand that's your motion. We'll argue 16 it. You can save whatever time you want for rebuttal out of 17 your 20 minutes, and then after we've got all the arguments, 18 we'll turn to the preliminary injunction and the motion to 19 strike. You both okay with that? 20 MR. SHOFF: Yes, Your Honor. 21 MS. FERGUSON: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Ms. Ferguson, maybe before you get 23 started, you can help me out. I think the order that's 24 attached to the complaint actually expired yesterday.

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there an extension of that?

1 MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor. That's been -- that 2 public health order has been renewed, and it was renewed 3 yesterday by order of the mayor and the city council for 4 another 60 days, until April 16. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Then we've got a case in 6 controversy as least as far as that goes. You may go ahead 7 and make your argument. 8 MS. FERGUSON: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 precedent in the Armstrong case. 17 18 19 the first count? 20 MR. SHOFF: 21 22 MS. FERGUSON: 23 24

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Thank you. Deborah Ferguson. beginning with that motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs have brought a two-count complaint. The first count was based on the supremacy clause. And my understanding is the plaintiffs have abandoned Count 1, because they have acknowledged that the supremacy clause doesn't create a private right of action. That's found in their response brief to the motion to dismiss at page 7, Your Honor, and that's based on U.S. Supreme Court THE COURT: That's also my understanding too. I'll just ask, Mr. Shoff, is that correct? You're abandoning That is correct, Your Honor, yes. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Ms. Ferguson. Thank you. So turning to Count 2, that's the substantive due process claim, and we move to strike Count 2 because the plaintiffs here lack standing. The standing test is set forth in the Laidlaw case, the Supreme

Court case, and requires the three factors -- all three factors must be fulfilled. The initial one is the injury in fact. It has to be traceable to the challenged action and redressable by the Court's order.

Now, as set forth in my briefing, three federal courts have dismissed mask mandate challenges for lack of standing. This is the *Bechade* case, *Oakes*, and *Parker*. In plaintiffs' response briefing, they ignore these cases. They just do not address them. I'd like to point out to the Court that no one here has been forced to wear a mask, and the order as drafted by the city council has eight separate exemptions. So this allows plaintiffs to choose, you know, whether or not they will go to public indoor places in Hailey. They can shop, they can eat out, and they can take exercise classes, whatever, in other communities that aren't subject to the mask mandate if they so choose.

It's also, I think, important to note that plaintiffs' complaint is really much more of a generalized grievance that would be common to the public. And this is something that the District Court in Pennsylvania pointed out in its decision in the *Parker* case. I would also submit that these allegations that they may at some future point be cited under this ordinance does not -- is insufficient for standing. That's possible future injuries, and that's not enough to create standing.

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Moving to the factor about whether or not a court order could redress this alleged harm, I think it is important to note that mask mandates would still remain in effect in the community. Specifically, the Blaine County School District has a mask mandate that would be unaffected by this Court's And businesses can require them; certainly medical facilities would. So I'm not sure that the relief requested would be redressable by the order they seek, and I'm urging that this Court do what several other federal sister courts have done with similar mask mandate challenges, where they have dismissed those cases for lack of standing.

Another basis for dismissal besides standing, Your Honor, is just a plain 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state

THE COURT: Before you move to that --

Yes.

THE COURT: -- back on the standing argument, it seems to me some of the facts that are alleged in this complaint are much more detailed than in the other cases you Does that make a difference for standing? They're not just generalized grievances; they're pretty particular grievances.

Uh-huh. Well, they -- I would agree MS. FERGUSON: that they have alleged more specific instances of what they say is psychological harm. I think Your Honor's correct with 1 that.

THE COURT: But does that make a difference in your mind?

MS. FERGUSON: Well, you know, I -- I still think they lack standing in that this is -- they're not forced to wear a mask. They have choices. They can -- they can change their behavior to avoid the requirements or avail themselves of one of the exceptions. So I would say they don't have standing to proceed.

THE COURT: All right. I probably ought to just comment, this has nothing to do with the case, but the camera that is on me is straight in front of me. I'm often looking to the right. That's because that's where I see you. I'm not ignoring your argument, but I'm not looking at you. I just wanted you to know.

MS. FERGUSON: I appreciate that. I thought I was uninteresting already.

THE COURT: That's why I said that.

MS. FERGUSON: Thank you. It's a new -- it's definitely a new setup to do an argument sitting down in my office.

THE COURT: You may continue.

MS. FERGUSON: Thank you. So turning to the 12(b)(6) basis for dismissal, the requirement to wear a mask in indoor public spaces in Hailey is a public health measure and, as I

mentioned already, subject to eight exemptions. It is not -not a medical treatment, and therefore it does not violate the
bodily integrity of any individual. It doesn't violate their
right to autonomy, and it does not violate their right to
consent to medical treatment because it isn't medical
treatment.

So because none of these rights come into play, the order doesn't implicate any fundamental right or violate the constitution. Put quite simply, there is no fundamental right not to wear a mask. And we have cited in our briefing very recent Federal District Court cases that ruled against -- consistently ruled against a challenge such as this to a public health mandate, and those are found at page 13 to 15 in our brief. And the plaintiffs have simply ignored most of that precedent. It isn't that they -- they did respond and try to distinguish a few of the cases, but the majority of them they just, I think, ignored as inconvenient.

So I want to underscore there is ample case authority to support a mask mandate as a public health measure during a global pandemic, and the plaintiffs have not attempted to distinguish those cases. Most of them have simply just been disregarded. And because there is no fundamental right not to wear a mask, the local government action must be reviewed under a rational basis standard.

Now, within the past 12 months, several Federal

District Courts have dismissed mask mandate challenges at the pleading stage, like I'm requesting that this Court do. And I would direct you specifically to the Forbes v. The County of San Diego case. Plaintiffs also argue -- and it's a much more nebulous argument, I think -- that masks violate international norms. And this is -- this is just incorrect. Masks in the pandemic are the standard throughout the world. And we have provided Dr. David Pate's declaration in support of opposition to the injunction. He references paragraph 24 in his declaration precisely this, that internationally masks are used and being used very effectively.

There's a recent large randomized study, the largest of its kind, that came out of Stanford and Yale medical centers. They went to rural Bangladesh. They studied the effectiveness of masks. And the reason for this study is in many of the world's very poor countries, vaccines haven't arrived in sufficient numbers or they don't have the distribution channels to distribute them. So they -- these doctors and scientists wanted to get some hard data on using masks and have found it very effective, so much so that they're expanding this to Southeast Asia.

So these violations plaintiffs have made about international law don't state a cause of action here. As a -- our federal courts aren't bound by some vague body of international law. And to say that, well, it's not a

particular international law; it's more of an international standard, and it violates the standards of decency to require someone to wear a mask is, I think, an absurd argument.

So I would submit, Your Honor, that plaintiffs' due process claim is not grounded in any sound legal theory, and it should be dismissed now at the pleading stage.

The -- you know, it's not lost on me and I'm sure on the Court that the Court itself has its own mask mandate, General Order 411, and that was renewed by Your Honor just last week. And that contains the Court's policies and procedures developed with CDC guidance and a local epidemiologist. The City of Hailey also relied on CDC guidance. And because we are in a stage red alert at the Boise courthouse, obviously today now we are appearing by Zoom. And regardless of the stage -- whether it be red, yellow, or green -- the Court requires coverings of the face to appear in court and to be worn at all times in the courthouse.

THE COURT: You're saying that to a judge who's not wearing a mask.

MS. FERGUSON: Well, you -- I don't see any staff or anyone close by. I'm sure you're social distancing.

THE COURT: That's exactly right.

MS. FERGUSON: You know, on the Court's website there is a link to a chart recently published in the Wall Street

Journal that speaks to the very strong effectiveness of some sorts of masks, the N95 masks, to present -- to prevent the spread of COVID. And I think -- I would imagine that's there as a link to help educate the public in the science behind these masking protocols and help them make an educated selection of the type of mask they should wear.

So if the Court were to find that there was a fundamental right during a global pandemic to be mask free in public places, then the plaintiffs -- then the Court's own policy would have to be abandoned here, because it would then also be unconstitutional if it was found to be violating a fundamental right. And that would rob the court of the authority to protect its staff and the public from the transmission of what we know to be a very highly contagious disease.

And I would end to say COVID has already killed over 5,000 Idahoans, and according to my most recent check with the Idaho COVID state-managed website, over 400,000 Idahoans have become infected. So there is no real end in sight, and the new variant is still ranging among us. So these safety measures and protocols remain as important as ever. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I am going to say for the record that I believe -- I understand the argument about the effectiveness of masks and mask mandates, but in my mind

that's really secondary to the question today of legal authority, and it's legal authority that I'm going to be looking at. We don't need to get into the effectiveness of the mask mandate.

Mr. Shoff, you may go ahead. I do have a couple of starting questions for you, if I may.

MR. SHOFF: Certainly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Ferguson gave us cases saying that there's no standing and there's no fundamental right. Do you have any cases that say the opposite? Because I couldn't find any.

MR. SHOFF: Not particularly with regard to a mask mandate, no, Your Honor. Our basis is on the overall -- the general Supreme Court jurisprudence with regard to standing as well as the standing in instances of fundamental rights. We cited specifically to the free exercise case -- I'm going to mispronounce this -- with the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Incorporated, which --

THE COURT: I'm glad you said that.

MR. SHOFF: I gave it my best shot, Your Honor. But I found that one particularly interesting in this situation, especially with regard to something that defendants have said in these oral arguments, which is that plaintiffs may always just change their behavior to avoid requirements. They could just not go into the town of Hailey, just not be -- you know,

run their businesses or participate in social or public life.

And one could say that the City of Hialeah in Florida could have said the same thing to practitioners of that religion, Santeria, which is the religion at issue in that instance, where the City was upset that the practitioners of the religion were pursuing animal sacrifices, so they banned that explicitly. And the Court said you can't. They had standing simply by virtue of their fundamental right, in this case their free exercise of religion. And you can't just go in and say, well, they could just change their religion and it would no longer affect them.

In a similar way, Your Honor, we would say that the plaintiffs have that fundamental right, which I can address later, regarding -- under both the theory of personal autonomy as well as the theory of bodily integrity. And to say, well, they could just forgo those fundamental rights to enjoy life in the city strikes me as violative of that effect.

But I'd be happy to answer any additional questions the Court may have before proceeding, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead. I may come up with some as you're talking, and if I do, I'll interrupt.

MR. SHOFF: Certainly, Your Honor. So addressing more specifically standing, the three elements at issue here, the first and arguably the most detailed is the issue of a legally protected interest. In this particular matter the

courts have said that you can have tangible or intangible injuries, and an intangible injury can nevertheless be concrete.

I point to the Friends of the Earth, Incorporated, which is a Supreme Court case in which the Court found that sworn statements that adequately document injury in fact -- which some of them were the members no longer felt safe to picnic on the banks of the river or bird-watch or wade because they were in the vicinity of a plant that was allegedly producing toxins or pollutants put into the water. There was no showing from my review of that case by any of these sworn statements that the individuals had any personal physical or psychological symptoms aside from the inability to enjoy the area.

And so this is a -- in the words of the *U.S. v.*Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (1973),

it's -- an identifiable trifle was sufficient to grant

standing under the injury in fact analysis. And just to point

out some of the examples of concrete tangible or intangible

harms in the complaint that the plaintiffs have already

alleged occur, again, we are in a motion to dismiss, and as

the Court is aware, the standard --

(Reporter interruption.)

MR. SHOFF: Thank you, ma'am. The Court may affirm a dismissal only if it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. And that was *Abboud v. INS*, a Ninth Circuit case from 1998.

So some examples of the concrete both tangible and intangible harms as alleged by plaintiffs include a particular child of a declarant experiences joint inflammation due to oxidative stress from wearing masks. A requirement to mask was damaging interpersonal contact, which is essential to a coaching business within the City of Hailey; that an individual suffered breathing problems; that wearing the mask causes depressive symptoms, felt suffocating, gave them headaches and dizziness.

THE COURT: But doesn't the exemption or the exception of -- if you have a medical condition, you can wear a face mask, a glass or plastic mask, instead of the cloth mask. Doesn't that account for that?

MR. SHOFF: To the extent that one has a condition that -- or one has a doctor's note. The way that my recollection is that it's written is that if you have a medical condition for which the mask would be, you know, intolerable, then in that case you do have an exemption. The defendants pointed out in their briefing, well, it's an honor system. Now, we pointed out -- or the plaintiffs pointed out that the chief of police of Hailey had chastened the individuals at the town for not obeying the mandate, so one

could call that into question whether or not it's truly ultimately on the honor system if enough people avail themselves of that.

But I think, more importantly, Your Honor, to say that, oh, if you have any condition, you can just ignore the mask mandate makes the mask mandate -- it becomes unenforceable. It's a nebulous sort of paper law without any effect. So I don't understand how the City of Hailey is putting into ordinances it says are so critical and essential to public health and then saying, well, you can just ignore it at your leisure.

THE COURT: I don't think that's what it says. It says if you have a medical condition, you can wear a face shield instead of a face mask. And that's a whole different ball game than just ignoring it.

MR. SHOFF: Well, Your Honor, and so even given --say the face shield would be tolerable. In that instance, there would still be the issues with facial contact, with children being set apart from their peers in those sort of situations. And so that would be -- those are just some of the actual and concrete issues.

In regard to -- there's the second aspect of this plank, which is, in addition to actual and imminent, there's also -- it's not conjectural or hypothetical, but we're talking imminent, so in other words future harm that could

happen. It doesn't mean that -- Spokeo, Incorporated, v. Robins, which is a 2016 Supreme Court case, talked about this, and it says the risk of real harm can indeed satisfy the requirement of concreteness just so long as it's not a general conjecture or hypothetical.

And it's in that instance, Your Honor, that plaintiffs feel that the detailed declarations and the statements point to that aspect of it as well, that there's the very real risk of harm, as outlined by the experts in their declarations. So in addition to both actual issues they're experiencing, now there's also the imminent physical and psychological harms they're facing additionally to that.

THE COURT: And I go back to where we started. If that's the case, why haven't other courts found standing?

MR. SHOFF: I think in -- and the plaintiffs did address a number of those cases, specifically Forbes, Zinman was one of them, Oberheim, and Alan v. Ige -- I apologize, I don't know how to pronounce that particular one -- address those at length. And several of those cases were motions for preliminary injunction, which would be a different standard than this present case. The District of Hawaii case, the Alan v. Ige, was a truly bizarre non sequitur that the Court said there's nothing pled here.

The allegations pled here in this present matter are very specific and are related to specific fundamental rights

rather than a general attempt to bring in -- some of these attempt to use the Fourth Amendment. They brought general arguments attempting to imply or bring other federal laws into their argument, and so they were dissimilar and distinguishable because of the specific arguments made in this case.

Moving on to the other two aspects of standing, the traceable to the challenged action, just as a practical matter, the city of Hailey is substantially larger than the other towns in Blaine County. It's about seven times larger, if memory serves, than Sun Valley. It's three or so times larger than Ketchum. It is the heart -- the social, economic, and recreational heart -- of the valley. And the plaintiffs, many of them have alleged that they live in Hailey, that they work in Hailey, that they run businesses in Hailey. And so the injury of, for example, them going into one of these other towns would be ameliorated by the fact that they generally are living their lives in the city of Hailey.

I'd also point out that both Ketchum and Sun Valley in the past week or two weeks, I believe, both removed their mask mandates, and so the -- by overwhelming majorities of their city councils. So the idea that those cities would have some sort of aspect of injury that would be traceable would no longer even be applicable.

And then finally that is related as well to the third

plank, the likelihood that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. Certainly, as defendants have just stated, that were the Court to find that these are fundamental rights that are being infringed, it would have knock-on effects elsewhere in the state of Idaho and so would in fact redress the injury.

And so I think it's relevant to point here before moving on to the question of the causes of action themselves -- or the cause of action itself is the question of, as stated by defendants, that this would somehow remove apparently the sole mechanism for protecting, for example, courthouse employees or children in Blaine County or the plaintiffs and citizens of Hailey.

There have been throughout this pandemic many different mechanisms and measures for -- and plaintiffs provided a not exhaustible but rather lengthy list of them in one of our briefings of actions that can be taken, many of which this Court has taken: As we are sitting here via Zoom would be a good example of one of them; but social distancing, contact tracing, quarantine of specific individuals; even something as limited or as specific and narrowly tailored, dare I say, as requiring individuals who test positive or who have symptoms to wear a mask. Those would all be options that would still -- again, in this hypothetical of the Court granting plaintiffs' cause of action, would still be available

to governments and state agencies.

And I think the parties are in agreement that it is the role of municipalities to protect and look out for the public health and safety of their citizens. The plaintiffs' concern in this case is that this particular measure in this particular way of being implemented is maximally invasive to their rights and to their personal integrity while being minimally effective. And so in that way it is not -- while the interest of the government may be compelling -- and again, we argue that we would be under a strict scrutiny and framework -- that this is not narrowly tailored to further that particular interest.

I would like to then move to specifically the jus cogen argument, because I think it is very important. And this goes back, Your Honor, to your previous question regarding whether or not this is -- this case is distinguishable from others. To my knowledge and to my review, there have been no other cases that have furthered this theory particularly because it is -- it is a difficult theory in terms of basing the proof and difficult in the sense of reading through the case law that relates to it. That was the reason for the lengthy, multipage, starting at Nuremberg to the present day, describing the creation of this particular jus cogens as the norm or the finding of it as an international basis.

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And so I think the parties would agree, if I recall from briefing, that there's no -- there's no question that the particular norm at issue here, that nonconsensual human experimentation, is a jus cogens norm. We cited numerous cases to that effect. I think that's widely agreed as a norm, that we don't experiment on people without their consent or knowledge.

The question is, is this experimentation? And that's the question that -- again, we're at the stage of a motion to dismiss. We're determining factual allegations at this point. What the argument that plaintiffs are putting forward is that this mask -- that the emergency use authorization, that the FDA's own documentation illustrates that these masks are experimental; that at the beginning of the pandemic, there was a number of studies -- and even before the pandemic -- where it was a wash, to put it just frankly, about whether masks would be efficacious or not whether they would be useful or not, whether they actually increase the risk. And it was not politically necessary to be clear on that at that point, because there wasn't a pandemic. But as soon as the pandemic started, it had -- a decision had to be made, and they made it.

And just because individuals and countries or states have violated a jus cogens norm, again, if you're able to demonstrate that they did doesn't mean that it's no longer a

norm. As Justice Gorsuch said in the Roman Catholic Diocese

v. Cuomo, in the time of a pandemic, the constitution doesn't

fall silent; it's still there. A jus cogens norm by virtue of

it of being at the level of treaties, as according to the

cases cited, is a fundamental right and is a fundamental

protection.

So that would be the first basis, that the mask is defined as a medical device by the FDA. It is used for a medical purpose: for the prevention of the transmission and the infection of both the wearer and people around them. And as such it is also experimental. It's not gone through -- in this use, it's not gone through the full gamut of requirements that the FDA has for wearing -- for selling objects or using them as medical devices. And so in that way it is quite experimental, and requiring individuals to wear it is a violation of that norm.

Finally then, Your Honor, addressing the question of bodily integrity and personal autonomy, plaintiffs have cited the Ninth Circuit case of *Benson v. Terhune*, I believe is how you pronounce that. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment substantively protects a person's right to be free from unjustified intrusions to the body, to refuse unwanted medical treatment, to receive specific information -- or sufficient information to exercise these rights intelligently.

The issue here -- and I find it very interesting --

is a number of the --

THE COURT: Before you move on, let's back up.

Before you move on to that, you're still arguing efficacy.

What part of the test that I'm to use weighs the reasonability of the order? In other words, the question I think I have to answer is, is it rationally related to the City's interest?

You've already said that their role is health and safety of their people. So how is this order not furthering that goal?

Meaning, whether it's 1 percent effective, 20 percent effective, or 99 percent effective, does that really matter at this stage of the lawsuit?

MR. SHOFF: Our argument, Your Honor, would be that the efficacy goes to whether or not -- for example, in your example there, if it's 1 percent effective versus if it's negative 5 percent effective, is it rationally related if it's actually injuring people? In addition, that rational relation to the governmental interest is dependent on it actually doing what it's intended to do.

But second of all, as their -- as the declarants of the plaintiffs' illustrate, for example, there is evidence in the scientific study that wearing these masks at a medical facility actually increased the wearers' likelihood of getting -- this was -- in this case it was an influenza virus, which influenza is very similar in size and structure to the coronavirus, so it's a relatively good analog. And they

provide all sorts of reasons why. I don't know exactly why, but the theory was that the moisture that was gathering helped to gather particles or what have you. There was any number of scientific explanations.

But the point, Your Honor, is that the City of Hailey and Mayor Burke have implemented something that is not only not efficacious but it is actually harmful. It is no longer rationally related to the actions they're attempting to take. And further, Your Honor, we would also argue that this case would pull us into the realm of strict scrutiny because of the fundamental rights that are implicated.

THE COURT: What fundamental rights are implicated?

MR. SHOFF: Well, specifically, Your Honor, that the jus cogens norm is against nonconsensual human experimentation, and that is at the level of a fundamental right according to the jurisprudence cited in plaintiffs' arguments. So that is one.

The second is the bodily integrity. And I find it very interesting in the District Courts that have addressed the issue of this particular plank, this 14th Amendment due process, that the courts are always using the analogy and they're saying the mask is -- its like a motorcycle helmet. But the issue there is that, first of all, a motorcycle helmet is narrowly tailored to a particular group of people:

motorcycle riders. But second of all, it's not a medical

device. It's not classified as such by the FDA. It's not used for a medical purpose.

In other words, the analogies that are being used so far to say that this right is more akin -- or that this situation is more akin to a smoking ban or that sort of thing don't contemplate the full extent that or don't take into account what the mask actually is, what a mask actually is in terms of how it is affecting people, how it is placed upon people, what its purpose is, which is critical to defining it. To say it's like a medical gown or a smoking ban is -- is diminishing the reality of what it is, Your Honor.

So that would be our arguments that pertain to the motion to dismiss at this time. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Ferguson, any response in rebuttal?

MS. FERGUSON: Just very briefly, Your Honor. You had referenced the medical exemption of the public health order. And Your Honor is correct that it does state -- and I'm going to quote from it. It's quite short: Persons who cannot medically tolerate wearing a cloth face covering must wear or position themselves behind a face shield. A person is not required to provide documentation demonstrating that the person cannot medically tolerate wearing a face cloth covering. So it is very much on the honor system. And if someone feels that they medically can't tolerate it, they

don't need any verification or a doctor's note; they simply can rely on this exemption to use a clear face shield instead.

And I think what's lost in the mechanics a little bit in some of the things that my opposing counsel said here is, you know, it isn't -- the City isn't dictating to its citizens and visitors the type of face mask they would wear. That's entirely up to their judgment and discretion. And it doesn't place them on anyone. So I think we get far afield, and it's a distortion of some of these FDA mandates to look at a face mask in this context, which may be just a homemade cloth mask, as a medical device.

And while it's true the FDA does consider masks medical devices, as Mr. Shoff had indicated, they consider -- and I highlight in my briefs so are hospital gowns. They're considered medical devices. And the guidance that was issued by the FDA that's been referenced in the case was guidance issued and point towards manufacturers. And I think the FDA's intent there was that they didn't want to create some sort of manufacturing loophole where less than surgical-quality masks would somehow be approved during the pandemic. But I don't think it has much relevance at all to use of masks by the general public which may be homemade.

And that's -- unless Your Honor has questions, that's all I have.

THE COURT: No, I don't have any other questions.

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So let's turn to the motion for preliminary Mr. Shoff, that's your motion. You can go first. injunction.

MR. SHOFF: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. And this, I believe -- if memory serves, the idea here was to be able to address both the motion to strike and preliminary injunction, if that is permissible with Your Honor, at the same time.

THE COURT: What I would suggest is you do your preliminary injunction. Ms. Ferguson, it's her motion to strike, isn't it? So let her argue that first, and then I'll give you time to respond to it.

> MR. SHOFF: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That way you don't have to guess what she's going to argue.

MR. SHOFF: Certainly, Your Honor. Very good. Ιn that case, I'll be relatively brief, Your Honor. I think the briefings have largely spoken, and both parties have demonstrated their arguments here.

The arguments with regard to the preliminary injunction do focus primarily around the question of efficacy and the balance of harms. I think the main question with regard to the balance of equities and whether the injunction is in the public interest really does hinge around how this Court reads and perceives the declarations provided both by the plaintiffs and the defendants, because if the Court

accepts the declarations of the plaintiffs' experts, then there is a very serious problem for the citizens and visitors to Hailey. If the Court declines to accept them, then there really is no particular balance of equities in favor of what the plaintiffs are arguing.

The basis for the argument is that the masks would be -- are -- again, according to the expert declarations, are inefficacious and may increase the risk of harm to individuals wearing them purely just by virtue of holding in and allowing a proliferation of particles to somebody as well as the risk of harms, specifically physiological but also psychological developmental and so forth.

And so in terms of -- as well, the likelihood of success on the merits, which of course is a major component of a preliminary injunction, is also related to what the parties have discussed so far. Of course, there's a different standard in this standard as opposed to a motion to dismiss. The Court will be delving much more deeply into the merits themselves of the arguments for the fundamental nature of the right at issue.

And so I would like, Your Honor, to save the remainder of my time that's available, first answer any questions that you have, but second to address any comments by Ms. Ferguson. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I don't have any questions,

but I will note you filed some kind of supplemental documentation two days ago. With my hearing schedule, I have not read it, so I don't know anything that it says. I don't intend it to be part of this hearing. But if you want to treat it as a supplemental brief postargument, that's fine, and then Ms. Ferguson would have an opportunity to respond to that after the hearing.

Ms. Ferguson, you may go ahead and argue either the preliminary injunction or your motion to strike that or both together, whichever works best for you.

MS. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll begin with the City's opposition to the preliminary injunction. I think the injunction should be denied because the likelihood of success on the merits here is very unlikely. Mask mandates are effective public health policies that don't implicate fundamental rights, and state and local governments have great latitude under their police power to protect health and safety. I mean, this is in the *Jacobson* case that the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1905, and that's still good law. And under that case, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that required a mandatory small pox vaccination to occur in the town of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

So I think in some ways we can look at that case and say, yeah, they're not going to succeed on the merits here.

And we're not talking about a mandatory, forced vaccination.

Far from it. We're talking about a far more moderate measure of a face mask or shield. And the Idaho Code, as I point out in briefing, under Chapter 50-304, 50-603 empowers Hailey to make regulations to preserve and protect the public's health and specifically to do what is necessary to prevent contagious diseases. So it is spot on in this situation.

Now, in opposition to the preliminary injunction, we have provided the Court with the declaration -- the expert declaration of Dr. David Pate. And he is a board-certified physician in internal medicine, the former CEO and president of Saint Luke's medical system here in Idaho, which is Idaho's largest employer and employs, in fact, beyond all of their other employees, 1,800 doctors.

And during this pandemic Dr. Pate has been the adviser to our governor, a member of his task force advising the citizens of Idaho about the proper response to this pandemic and really -- and taking to the radio once a week in an hourlong talk show to talk and field questions from the public about how all things COVID. And he is a very strong advocate of masks and, I think, has effectively explained to the Court why and their effectiveness. So looking -- looking -- and I would add that Dr. Pate provided his declaration and his expert testimony pro bono. He wants simply to have the information out there and support these kind of efforts, public health safety efforts.

You know, looking at some of the other factors of a PI, moving on from likelihood of success of the merits, there's the idea of irreparable harm. And I've never seen a preliminary injunction where -- I mean, irreparable harm, here we have the death of over 5,000 Idahoans and their families irrevocably impacted, hundreds of children made orphans. So I think all reasonable measures to prevent the spread should certainly be taken up and local governments commended for them.

This gets into the balance of harms. I would submit that wearing a mask not in one's home, not in other circumstances, but in public places is a minor inconvenience -- and if it too much of an inconvenience, a face shield is more than acceptable -- is what we're balancing against, against the threat of a highly communicable disease that can be fatal.

And this is probably the best example I've ever seen of whether the public interest favors this relief. Because this is precisely about the public interest, which is far more important than individual preferences here. You know, as Dr. Pate has said, a cry for individual freedom here really misses the mark. And we have to be concerned about the vulnerable members of our community and do everything we can to protect the elderly and the children.

So that's my response to the motion for PI, and I'd

like to just move right into my motion to strike the declarations, if I may.

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

MS. FERGUSON: So Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that a witness be qualified in order to offer expert testimony. And the burden, of course, is on the proponent of the expert to prove this. The witnesses that the plaintiffs have advanced in this case are all testifying on subject matter outside their professions and their education, and none have disclosed that they've ever served as expert witnesses.

I'll start with Harald Walach. He is a German psychologist. He does not have a degree in medicine. He did not go to medical school. He's not an MD. And he claims vast -- he's not lacking in confidence. He claims vast expertise in some very general, sweeping fields. He claims to be an expert in medical research, in the evaluation of health technology, in clinical and experimental studies of any nature apparently, and research methodology. He has published two COVID-related articles. Both of those publications have been redacted. And he has been the subject of -- I would say "ridicule" is not too strong a word -- ridicule by the scientific community. He has been given an award for being a pseudoscientific nuisance.

So he has two opinions in his conclusion of his declaration. I'm just going to -- he has many more than two,

but I'm going to focus in on two that are rather extraordinary. It is his opinion that the spread of asymptomatic COVID-19 is almost entirely nonexistent. And we know from Dr. Pate that according to his medical expertise and his understanding of this virus, as he guides Idaho through its course, that most of transmission of the disease is happening among asymptomatic people, whereas Mr. Walach --Dr. Walach is saying this is almost entirely nonexistent. He's also claiming that wearing a mask poses a serious risk to the public because they might do it wrong.

And I would submit that he's not only wrong, but this is just -- he's dead wrong. These are dangerous opinions. So because his declaration is highly unreliable, and I submit it is based on junk science, it should be stricken.

The others -- two other opinions are -- one is from a Susan Wagner, and she has a opinion on carbon dioxide poisoning from masks. She is a German citizen who was trained as a veterinarian, but she no longer practices veterinary medicine. She now works as a freelancer in fundraising for startup companies. She has not indicated that she has any information on any of the plaintiffs and their carbon dioxide status related to masking. She relies on studies related to pregnant animals. And she has no basis to offer an expert opinion on any issue that is before the Court in this case. So I would submit her testimony is also highly unreliable and

irrelevant, and her declaration should be stricken.

And lastly, the -- there was a declaration provided by another German citizen, Daniela Prousa. Now, she studied as an undergraduate in psychology in her country, and she now describes herself as a human rights activist. And she has a belief that mask-wearing during a global pandemic will have a fatal effect on humanity. But that opinion has nothing to do with the City of Hailey's mask mandate. And for those -- all of those reasons and more, her testimony is entirely unreliable, and her declaration should be stricken.

And I urge the Court to actually strike them if the case does not -- is not subject to dismissal for standing, because there is a danger in letting them stand and just considering them for what they're worth. And that is, the Health Freedom Defense Fund has filed another action in this district, in our district, the District of Idaho, against the Blaine County School District. It has filed other actions in California and other states. And my fear is that if the declarations were allowed to stand as valid, reliable expert testimony, they could bootstrap junk science into these other cases and say that their testimony was heard by the Idaho District Court.

Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I do not. Thank you.

MS. FERGUSON: Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Counsel, Mr. Shoff, you may respond. 2 MR. SHOFF: Certainly, Your Honor. The Federal Rules 3 of Evidence 702 specify --4 (Reporter interruption.) MR. SHOFF: -- specify a witness qualified as an 5 6 expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 7 may testify if it provides for --8 THE COURT: Counsel, did you change something on your 9 microphone? You're cutting in and out on us. Earlier you 10 were great, but now it's picking up every other word. MR. SHOFF: I apologize, Your Honor. I'm not sure 11 12 what's going on there. 13 THE COURT: Well, right now I can hear you fine. 14 MR. SHOFF: All right. Well, I apologize. 15 know, Your Honor, if there's an issue. I apologize for that. 16 But specifically I wanted to highlight in the Rules 17 of Evidence 702 that, (b) and (c), the testimony is based on 18 sufficient facts or data and that the testimony is the product 19 of reliable principles and methods. 20 And the defendants in this hearing made some bold 21 pronouncements that there was junk science, this is junk 22 science; in fact, that these documents are so dangerous that 23 they should be stricken, which is concerning both for the 24 scientific process at large, which is fundamentally a process

of contention and debate, but also because of the thing that's

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missing, that is most conspicuous by absence in this particular case, which is the lack of comment about the literally dozens of studies with hundreds of authors between themselves cited by these experts, analyzed at length, and used to establish the positions. In other words, the experts are merely standing as experts in their field, basing their opinions on the testimony -- basing their testimony on facts and data articulated by others, articulated by peer-reviewed papers, and put forward to this Court to put forward what their declarations are about.

In contrast, Dr. David Pate, I have no doubt -- I don't know, actually, because we were not provided with his CV. All we have is the information provided briefly in his background that he practiced internal medicine 12 years ago, if memory serves, in the state of Texas. He was never licensed in the state of Idaho, but he obviously came as the administrator. I imagine he served as an illustrious hospital administrator before his retirement, I believe in January 2020. But there's nothing in his record that demonstrates that he has any training, any experience, any knowledge about how to read and analyze a scientific paper, a peer-reviewed study, to arrive at a conclusion.

He would be an excellent witness to testify in general as to the course of action taken by the governor or how the task force worked or even how the state proceeded

through the pandemic. In fact, I see from his -- he gave
Facebook Live Q and A's. He seems like an excellent
individual to answer questions people have about the pandemic
in general on the public level, individuals who are curious.
He is apparently coauthoring a book about the lessons learned
from the pandemic. So from a policy perspective, from the
public policy perspective, he would seem to be an excellent
individual for that.

However, he has not and when you read his declaration does not delve at all into the science. He doesn't go -- he didn't offer alternative statements. He doesn't argue that Professor Dr. Harald Walach, for example, in his reading of the studies -- in fact, directly contravening the studies that Dr. Pate relies upon -- he doesn't explain how Dr. Walach's reading of it is inaccurate.

Professor Dr. Walach doesn't have one but two Ph.D.s, first in psychology but second in the philosophy and history of science. He's written more than 200 papers, 100 book chapters. He has -- his career is as wide-ranging as his experience is. He served on staff at hospitals, as a lecturer, as a visiting professor at three universities, a researcher in a department of epidemiology. He has broad experience but very specifically in reading a scientific paper, understanding the statistics and the methodology, understanding how conclusions are derived at, and then drawing

out those conclusions.

Now, defendants seem to make hay out of the fact that Dr. Walach and Ms. Prousa have both had papers that were rejected during this pandemic. Now, I can't speak exactly to the reasons because generally, aside from the public reasons, we don't see why papers were rejected or for what reason. But further, I'd like to point out that throughout this pandemic, papers have made -- or scientific journals, medical journals have made the decision to forgo the usual long, drawn-out peer review process to have information go out as quickly as possible. That's because they wanted to address the pandemic quickly and to get important information out to be seen and to be debated in public. But the effect of that has been that that peer review process which would normally be internal has been externalized. It's now very public.

So it's disingenuous to draw attention to retracted papers and say, oh, well, that means that this person isn't credible in the scientific community. Rather, what that means is we don't know for sure which papers would be retracted internally, would be reworked, would be edited and revised elsewhere. So I think that, from that perspective, that's a moot point.

Going back to Walach in particular, he cites 19 independent papers through his declaration, scientific studies, peer-reviewed articles and papers. Some are them are

in opposition to his final point. And that's the critical thing here, is that Professor Dr. Walach speaks from the broad scientific perspective. What -- are masks efficacious or not? Are they harmful or not? Do they increase or reduce the risk of harm? He takes a look at studies, including several actually that Dr. Pate cites without analysis, and he draws his conclusions from his deep understanding of the scientific method and of how to read a paper.

So he provides for you -- for Your Honor testimony based in sufficient facts or evidence, using reliable scientific principles, and manages in his analysis and then applying them to the facts at issue with regard to masks. So from that regard, Professor Dr. Walach is an appropriate expert for providing for the Court that useful information that will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or the facts at issue.

Regarding Dr. Wagner, I -- I truly don't understand where defendants' issue comes from in regards to her background, but I'll endeavor to address it. Defendants stated that she's not a toxicologist, that she's just trained as a veterinarian and hasn't worked as one for a while. But plaintiffs have provided her CV. She has made a career for a substantial amount of time in the scientific research and medical product field.

The fundamental reason for this and the reason why an

animal research -- why would we care about what happens to animals is because it is simply unethical to test something like, well, how toxic is too toxic for this particular chemical or compound. Medical ethics boards would never allow this to happen at the preliminary level on humans, so it's done on animals.

And Dr. Wagner's whole career has been the creation of medicines, understanding that critical interaction between how does a medicine affect an animal and then how is that scaled, because a rat, a mouse, what have you, has a very different physiology, has a different scale of how chemicals affect them. Dr. Wagner's specific declaration points out that most of the studies that we have regarding carbon dioxide toxicity are related to animals specifically and then have to be scaled. And she is the perfect expert to illustrate why these studies matter because she has that experience that life experience. She also further cites 27, by my count, unique scientific studies or articles in her paper.

And I wanted to draw attention to a particular comment the defendant made -- defendants made in the last brief filed, the reply to the opposition to the motion to strike, saying there is no scientific support that Wagner provided for the statement that masks dramatically increase the levels of carbon dioxide and respired air. Yet the Court can note in Docket 18-3, page 8, Dr. Wagner cites five

independent studies with several dozen authors, if memory serves, between them that have all tested with sensors and various different positions with different types of masks the amount of carbon dioxide that's respired or retained in the mask over various time periods. And in fact, Dr. Wagner provided that information in a table on page 9 -- it's called Table 1 in the declaration -- that specifically looks at this question and identifies the increase above background normal.

So again, Dr. Wagner's purpose in the declaration is to illustrate that link between the toxicity of carbon dioxide and the issue with masks retaining carbon dioxide and what we could expect to see in terms of physiological harm. So in that case as well she's very clearly, looking at her CV, an expert in that particular field of understanding that scale and understanding the link and applying it.

Finally, Ms. Prousa, Daniela Prousa, I don't understand why defendants have cherry-picked the CV. They only mention her work in advocacy as -- as her sole work, that she has an undergraduate degree and she's just an advocate. But her CV indicates that she's provided psychology and psychotherapy services to multiple institutions, over something like an 11- or 12-year career thus far, in residential homes, a district hospital, a clinic, a pediatric center, a Catholic youth care facility; and even the German pension and insurance program, where she in particular focused

on stress management, which is of a special import here because stress is -- chronic stress is one of the dangerous conditions that wearing a mask repeatedly does that Dr. Wagner's research pointed to, which was that inhaling carbon dioxide even at relatively low levels but for a long period of time -- say, for instance, being required to wear a mask within the city of Hailey -- could cause serious stress reactions which have both physiological and psychological symptoms. But again, Ms. Prousa cites to an additional 14 studies beyond -- and that's actually beyond her own which she cites.

And so finally, Your Honor, from that perspective the plaintiffs would argue that each of these experts were picked in particular, were spoken with. And similarly to defendants', they also provided their services, to my knowledge, to be pro bono as well, because they are concerned about the effects of masks on individuals and they're concerned that there will be long-term developmental delays, that there could be long-term psychological issues.

And so the basis for the preliminary injunction and the reason why the plaintiffs felt it appropriate to approach the Court with this was because in the balance of the equities, the question is not -- there's this false dichotomy that's been set up that if we disallow masks, well, it's implied that these deaths would skyrocket, the 5,000 deaths in

1 Idaho, whereas masks would somehow stop this or reduce it. 2 Whereas plaintiffs' experts have demonstrated from dozens of 3 scientific studies -- again, contravened essentially not at 4 all by defendants' expert, who did not address any of them or 5 any of their particular arguments about specific studies in 6 detail -- that the masks themselves could very likely cause 7 ongoing chronic issues into the future. 8 And that will be, again, the basis of the plaintiffs' 9 argument here, Your Honor. I'd be happy to answer any 10 questions if you have them. 11 THE COURT: Well, the one question I have I probably 12 shouldn't ask, so I won't. 13 Ms. Ferguson, any response in closing? 14 MS. FERGUSON: No, Your Honor. Unless you have a 15 question for me, I'll decline. 16 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, I am going to ask 17 this one. I think this one is highly appropriate, and this 18 would be for Mr. Shoff. The defendants cite in their briefing 19 WHO, CDC, Mayo. Those are pretty reputable sources, aren't 20 they? 21 MR. SHOFF: Yes, they are, Your Honor. And

MR. SHOFF: Yes, they are, Your Honor. And Dr. Walach himself also cites to WHO, World Health Organization, studies as well and in fact a meta study where they compiled several dozen, if memory serves, and demonstrated that there's no appreciable benefit and

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potentially a risk from masks. So plaintiffs' experts have 1 2 addressed these contentions and have addressed many of the studies the CDC is relying on to come to this conclusion. 3 4 THE COURT: Counsel, I appreciate the arguments that have been made and the briefs that have been written. 5 6 we've got a bit of a time-sensitive matter here. 7 thing I want to have happen is have my order come out after 8 the mask mandate goes away. That doesn't help anybody. 9 we'll take this under advisement. I'll get a decision out as 10 quickly as I can. 11 Is there anything else that needs to be discussed 12 today? 13 MR. SHOFF: Not from the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 14 MS. FERGUSON: Not from the defendants. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Court will be in 16 recess. (Proceedings concluded at 4:11 p.m., February 16, 2022.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE

I, ANNE BOWLINE, a Registered Merit Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand the proceedings contained herein on the aforementioned subject on the date herein set forth, and that the foregoing 45 pages constitute a full, true and correct transcript.

Dated this 25th day of March, 2022.

/s/ Anne Bowline

ANNE BOWLINE Registered Merit Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter